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+World Politics
+http://journals.cambridge.org/WPO
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+International System And Foreign Policy
+Approaches: Implications for Conict Modelling
+and Management
+Raymond Tanter
+World Politics / Volume 24 / Supplement S1 / March 1972, pp 7 - 39
+DOI: 10.2307/2010558, Published online: 18 July 2011
+Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100002860
+How to cite this article:
+Raymond Tanter (1972). International System And Foreign Policy Approaches:
+Implications for Conict Modelling and Management. World Politics, 24, pp 7-39
+doi:10.2307/2010558
+Request Permissions : Click here
+Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/WPO, IP address: 130.60.206.75 on 06 May 2015
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND
+FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES:
+Implications for Conflict Modelling
+and Management
+By RAYMOND TANTER*
+. . . The international system is an expanding version of the notion of
+two-actors-in-interaction. . . . Interaction analysis focuses on the outputs
+of national systems. The national systems, themselves, are black-boxed.
+—Charles A. McClelland1
+If a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational
+components must yesterday have been performing (or have had established
+routines for performing) an action only marginally different from
+that action.
+—Graham T. Allison2
+INTRODUCTION
+THE quotations from Charles A. McClelland and Graham T. Allison
+represent two distinct approaches to the study of international
+relations: (i) international system analysis; and (2) foreign policy
+analysis. Essentially, international system analysts seek to explain interactions
+between nations by phenomena such as their prior interactions
+and the structure of the system. Foreign policy analysts, on the other
+hand, seek to explain foreign policy behavior as the output of subnational
+organizations following standard operating procedures or engaging
+in a problem-solving search. Given the international system and
+foreign policy approaches as contrasting points of departure, the goals
+of the present study are:
+•Acknowledgments to ONR Contract Number Noooi4-67-A-oi8i-oo26, ARPA #1411
+for support; to Cheryl Kugler, Hazel Markus, Michael Mihalka, Stephen Shaffer, and
+Lewis Snider for research assistance; to Patricia Armstrong for typing; to Graham T.
+Allison, Robert R. Beattie, Morton H. Halperin, Nazli Choucri, Robert C. North and
+Robert A. Young, whose ideas helped guide this inquiry; to Lutz Erbring, Edward L.
+Morse, Richard H. Ullman and Oran R. Young for helpful critique; to Charles A.
+McClelland, whose ideas and World Event/Interaction Survey provided a basis for the
+modelling and coding procedures used in the study; and to Walter Corson for providing
+his data, scaling system, and helpful interpretations.
+1 Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York 1966),
+20, 104.
+2 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston
+1971), 87.
+8 RAYMOND TANTER
+1. to evaluate models based on an international system approach, a
+foreign policy approach, and a combination of both approaches as they
+are used to study alliance behavior in conflict situations; and
+2. to infer from the evaluation of these models some implications for
+conflict modelling and management.
+International system approaches may imply interaction models,
+whereas foreign policy approaches may suggest decision-making models.
+For example, J. D. Singer posits that by focusing on the international
+system, we can study the patterns of interaction which the system
+reveals,3 while game theoretic approaches to the study of conflicts of
+interest blend both interaction and decision-making concepts through
+their emphasis on strategic interaction and rational choice behavior.4
+Game theory deals with strategic situations in which the consequences
+of action are uncertain; several different outcomes may result from a
+given action.0 Players in a game confront others who are assumed to be
+rational and whose choices also affect the outcome of the game. A game
+theoretic approach to conflict thus emphasizes strategic interaction and
+bargaining under conditions of risk.0
+An alternative set of conflict models widely employed in world politics
+concerns arms race processes. The most familiar is the Richardson
+process model, named after Lewis Richardson.7 Richardson's model
+stresses interaction processes between nations but ignores rational choice
+behavior. The outcome of Richardson's model " . . . is what would occur
+if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled."8 The model
+ignores choice processes internal to a state and stresses the automatic
+response of one nation to the arms expenditures of another. The model
+3 J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in
+Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System (Princeton 1961), 80.
+It should be noted that the interaction approach is often distinguished from the international
+system approach. The latter orientation is based on the assumption that international
+politics is more than the sum of converging interactions and transactions;
+properties of the system as a whole are assumed to influence the behavior of individual
+nations.
+4 The term strategic interaction in game theory often refers to the outcome of
+competing strategies. Here, interaction means the process where each actor pays attention
+to and responds to the prior patterns of his opponent.
+5 See Herbert Simon, "Some Strategic Considerations in the Construction of Social
+Science Models," in Paul Lazarsfeld, ed., Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences
+(Glencoe 1954), 388-415. Also see Herbert Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational;
+Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting (New York
+1957), 241-60.
+6 See Anatol Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor 1966).
+7 Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes
+and Origins of War (Pittsburgh i960).
+*lbid., 12.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 9
+is deterministic and described in terms of "social physics."9 There are
+a variety of arms race models which have attempted to improve on
+Richardson's formulation. Martin McGuire's model, for example, incorporates
+rational choice behavior.10
+Less formal than the game theoretic and Richardson process models
+are the mediated stimulus response (S-R) and event/interaction models
+of Robert North and Charles McClelland respectively.11 North's model
+focuses on perception as an explanatory concept intervening between a
+stimulus and a response. McClelland, on the other hand, emphasizes
+prior international event/interaction sequences and systemic configurations
+as explanations for present international interactions.12
+The game theory model assumes rational choice behavior; the mediated
+stimulus response, the event/interaction, and Richardson process
+models allow for irrational (misperception) or non-rational (recurring
+event sequence) behavior.13 Nevertheless, all four classes of models have
+in common the interaction theme. That is, each model explains present
+interaction on the basis of prior interaction with a minimum of focus
+on the internal attributes of the actor.14 Of these four interaction models,
+9 Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor i960), 15-107; and
+"Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
+1 (September 1957), 249-99. See also Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A
+General Theory (New York 1962); Paul Smoker, "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical
+Study," in J. N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (2nd
+ed., New York 1969), 573-82.
+lu Martin C. McGuire, Secrecy and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass. 1965).
+11 Robert C. North, "Research Pluralism and the International Elephant," in Klaus
+Knorr and James Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics
+(Princeton 1969), 218-42; Robert C. North, "The Behavior of Nation-States: Problems
+of Conflict and Integration," in Morton Kaplan, ed., New Approaches to International
+Relations (New York 1968), 203-356; Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard,
+"Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," in Rosenau (fn. 9), 711-24.
+12 Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis," in Knorr and Verba
+(fn. 3), 182-204; "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963,"
+in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics (New York 1968), 159-86.
+Event/interactions are international actions such as threats and promises (words) or
+uses of force and offers of proposals (deeds). Event/interactions are different from
+transactions such as trade and mail flows between nations. The present study deals
+only with connective event/interactions since there were too few cooperative interactions
+during the Berlin conflict of 1961 to perform statistical analysis.
+13 See below, however, for a discussion of how recurring event sequences may be
+subsumed under learning models and how such models explain limited rational search
+behavior.
+11 The mediated S-R model draws on internal attributes (perceptions) more than
+the other models. Similarly, game theory models applied to world politics focus on
+the rational intentions of decision-makers, which tap internal attributes of nations. A
+major criticism of game theory models, however, is their treatment of an actor as a
+black-box, ignoring psychological and behavioral attributes. See John C. Harsanyi,
+"Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories,"
+World Politics, xxi (July 1969), 513-38; Michael Shapiro, "Rational Political
+Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," American Po10
+RAYMOND TANTER
+the present study draws most from the event/interaction model. A hypothesis
+derived from this model is that the current behavior of the
+Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in an East-West conflict is a consequence
+of a prior pattern of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
+(NATO) actions, and vice versa.
+Recall the earlier suggestion that international system approaches suggest
+interaction models while foreign policy approaches may imply
+decision-making models. An early decision-making scheme is the one
+pioneered by Richard Snyder and his associates.15 Although their original
+decision-making scheme allows for international system determinants
+of foreign policy behavior, the scheme mostly relies on the organizational
+roles—communication, information, and personality variables,
+especially motivation—which constitute the internal setting of decisions.
+16 As with game theory, the decision-making scheme assumes
+rationality, but rationality is a more limited concept than the comprehensive
+version assumed in game theory. In game theory goals are
+ranked, all alternatives are specified, consequences are calculated, and
+rational choice consists of selecting the value-maximizing alternative.
+In the decision-making scheme, however, men are bounded by: (i) the
+lack of an explicit preference ordering; (2) incomplete information on
+alternatives; and (3) inadequate computational skills to calculate the
+consequences of each option. All three limitations violate the requirements
+of comprehensive rationality.17
+The Snyder scheme focuses on the attributes of individuals as well
+titical Science Review, LXIH (December 1969), 1106-19. Simon modified game theory
+by incorporating attributes of the actor and then inferring a new decision-rule—
+"satisficing" (Simon, fn. 5, 241-60). Experimental gaming explicitly treats properties of
+the actors such as competitiveness, risk, and temptation, as well as rewards and punishment.
+Melvin Guyer, "A Review of the Literature on Zero-Sum and Non-Zero-Sum
+Games in the Social Sciences," Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan,
+Mimeo, n.d.
+15 Richard C. Snyder and others, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York
+1962); James A. Robinson and Richard C. Snyder, "Decision-Making in International
+Politics," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York 1965), 433-63;
+Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision (New York 1968); Charles F. Hermann, Crises in
+Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (Indianapolis 1969); J. A. Robinson and others,
+"Search Under Crisis in Political Gaming and Simulation," in D. G. Pruitt and R. C.
+Snyder, eds., Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969),
+80-94.
+16 Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist
+Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," in f. N. Rosenau, ed.,
+International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York 1961), 196.
+17 Simon (fn. 5); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York
+1958); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
+(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963).
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 11
+as on their foreign policy organizations. The decision-making model
+explicated by Graham Allison primarily stresses organizational processes.
+18 Allison's model explains government behavior as the output of
+large organizations functioning according to standard operating procedures
+and search processes. Like Snyder's scheme, Allison's model assumes
+limited rationality rather than the comprehensive rationality of
+game theory models. Allison's organizational processes explanation
+asserts the following principle: Stop searching with the first alternative
+that is good enough—the "satisficing" rule.19 The present study draws
+more on the Allison work than on Snyder's efforts. Consider Allison's
+inference from an organizational processes model: "The best explanation
+of an organization's behavior at [time] t is / — i; the best prediction
+of what will happen at / -)- i is t."20 Following Allison's model, a
+hypothesis is that the current behavior of WTO in an East-West conflict
+is a consequence of its own prior pattern of actions, and similarly
+for NATO.
+The international system and foreign policy approaches may both
+yield adequate explanations of international behavior. Similarly, event/
+interaction and organizational processes models may apply to the same
+situation. Thus, the study evaluates: (i) an event/interaction model;
+(2) an organizational processes model; and (3) a combined interaction/
+organizational model. Consider the following illustrations of these
+three models. The event/interaction model assumes that WTO behavior
+was a reaction to the prior pattern of NATO events. That is,
+WTO countries decided to construct the Berlin Wall as a result of prior
+NATO provocations, e.g., the encouragement of a mass refugee flow
+from East Germany to West Germany via Berlin. Similarly, NATO
+behavior was a reaction to prior WTO events. NATO countries increased
+their defense budgets and sought alliance agreement on economic
+sanctions in reaction to Soviet threats to sign a separate peace
+treaty with the East Germans and to turn over control of Berlin access
+routes.
+An organizational processes model, on the other hand, might stress
+such variables as standard operating procedures and the problem-solving
+search processes of organizations as explanations for alliance actions.
+Consider this explanation of an official U. S. reply to the Soviet aide
+18 Allison (fn. 2). 19 Simon (fn. 5).
+20 Allison (fn. 2), 87. Allison's "explanation" of present behavior as determined by
+prior behavior is not an explanation in the sense of specifying why the present behavior
+occurs. A learning model may be able to explain why organizations repeat or deviate
+from prior patterns.
+12 RAYMOND TANTER
+memoire and subsequent U. S. actions during the Berlin conflict of
+1961: For weeks President John F. Kennedy waited to reply to a Soviet
+threat to Western access routes to Berlin which was implied by a Soviet
+aide memoire. The Department of State drafted a reply; Kennedy rejected
+it as stale and uninspired. He asked Theodore Sorensen to draft
+a new reply. Then Kennedy discovered the new reply could not be released
+without going through complicated allied and interdepartmental
+clearances. He gave up the new attempt and issued the earlier State Department
+reply.21 The organizational processes model anticipates standard
+operating procedures and helps explain some of the foreign policy
+output. Perhaps partly as a result of his dissatisfaction with the perfunctory
+U. S. reply, Kennedy searched for more direct ways of answering
+the Soviet aide memoire, e.g., by increasing the military budget.22
+The interaction/organization model combines the reaction and organizational
+process explanations into a single model. Prior studies suggest
+that a combination may be more powerful as an explanatory device
+than either the international system or foreign policy approach taken
+separately. Consider the studies by Nazli Choucri and Robert North.
+Although Choucri and North seek to explain international conflict behavior
+over longer periods of time, their work is nevertheless relevant
+here. Between 1870 and 1914, they find that a nation's role in international
+conflict was less a consequence of changes in that nation's own
+capabilities (i.e., the foreign policy approach) than of the changing
+distances between itself and rival nations, particularly its closest rival
+(i.e., the international system approach). They conclude, however, that
+neither the foreign policy nor the international system approach alone
+is adequate to explain the international conflict process.23 Thus, the present
+study combines the international system and foreign policy type approaches
+in creating an interaction/organization model. A specific
+hypothesis based on the interaction/organization model is that WTO
+behavior in an East-West conflict is a consequence of both its own prior
+actions and prior NATO actions, and similarly for NATO.
+The following three working hypotheses, thus, are: (1) an alliance's
+behavior in conflict situations results from the prior pattern of actions
+of its opponent (event/interaction); (2) an alliance's behavior in conflict
+situations results from its own prior patterns of actions (organiza-
+21 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York 1965), 587.
+22 This interpretation of the organizational model seems to imply that Kennedy increased
+the U.S. military budget because of his dissatisfaction with the State Department.
+External factors such as the W T O threat clearly should be considered to explain
+the increase in the military budget in this case.
+23 See the essay by Nazli Choucri and R. C. North in this volume.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 13
+tional processes); (3) an alliance's behavior in conflict situations results
+from both the opponent's prior pattern of behavior and its own prior
+pattern of actions (interaction/organization).233
+AN EVENT/INTERACTION MODEL
+McClelland has laid the theoretical framework for the event/interaction
+model in a series of essays. In the 1961 special issue of World
+Politics, his essay on "The Acute International Crisis" explicates an
+event/interaction model.24 He suggests that events in conflicts might
+form a chain of interaction sequences, and the discovery of these sequences
+would permit comparisons across cases. McClelland's model
+describes the state of the international system in terms of its pattern
+(process), structure, and performance. Needed data are of two types:
+relationships to tap structure, and interactions as indicators of system
+process.25 In a later article, McClelland evaluated several propositions
+with interaction data concerning access to Berlin, 1948-1963.26 For example,
+he evaluated one of the ideas put forward in the 1961 article: the
+greater the number of intense conflicts between two actors, the more
+likely each will develop routines for minimizing violence. These routines
+develop as bureaucrats learn standard operating procedures to
+process repetitive conflicts.27 Although the 1968 design does not provide
+an explicit test of the learning idea, there is some evidence supporting
+it in the Berlin case. Finally, an assumption of McClelland's event/interaction
+model is that there are certain international processes, such as
+arms races, which occur regularly with specific international situations
+such as intense conflicts. The task of the analyst of the international
+system is to discover the processes which accompany various situations
+and to forecast future processes.28
+23a The distinction between event/interaction and organizational processes is for t he
+sake of convenience of presentation. In a sense, there is only one model that contains
+interaction and organization parameters. Interaction parameters may be relatively more
+important at times, while organizational factors may be more significant at other
+times. See Tanter, 1972, for a more complete synthesis of interaction and organizational
+parameters than given here.
+"McClelland, in Knorr and Verba (fn. 3 ) .
+25 McClelland (fn. 1), chapter 4.
+26 McClelland, in Singer (fn. 12) 159-86.
+27 McClelland, in Knorr and Verba (fn. 3 ) , 200-201. Note that one can explain
+event/interaction processes with an organizational model, a partial synthesis of the
+approaches of McClelland and Allison. Also, McClelland actually uses the term crisis
+where the interpretation in the text above refers to conflicts. T h e word crisis refers
+to the most intense phase of a conflict in the present study.
+28 Robert A. Young, "Prediction and Forecasting in International Relations: An
+Exploratory Analysis," unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California (June
+1970).
+14 RAYMOND TANTER
+McClelland's event/interaction model is the least formal and the least
+explicitly theoretical of the interaction models discussed above. It makes
+the simple assumption that an interaction pattern will continue under
+the conditions of a specific international situation and structure. Recall
+Allison's inference from his organizational processes model: "The best
+explanation of an organization's behavior at [time] t is / — i; the best
+prediction of what will happen at t -f-1 is /." McClelland's model makes
+a similar statement but it explains continuity of patterns by referring
+to the international situation and structure. McClelland's model, however,
+does not explain the continuation of a pattern by referring to
+axiomatic assumptions regarding rationality or learning, assumptions
+which would provide closure for either a deductive or inductive explanation.
+For example, game theory draws upon rationality in a deductive
+argument to explain rational choice. The power of game theory lies
+in its elegant deductive explanation of a wide range of rational choice
+behavior. When applied to the complexities of world politics, however,
+game theory loses its elegance as well as its deductive power. In a model
+of world politics, one cannot have deductive power without sacrificing
+the empirical fit of the model. There are definite trade-offs between
+logical closure on the one hand and empirical fit on the other hand.
+One can gain some closure by assuming that event/interaction patterns
+will continue as a consequence of prior reinforcement—a learning
+model. The learning model explains inductively the continuity of specific
+event patterns.
+Regarding inductive and deductive explanations, Abraham Kaplan
+asserts, ". . . we know the reason for something either when we can fit
+it into a known pattern, or else when we can deduce it from known
+truths."29 Kaplan states that the inductive pattern type of explanation
+may be appropriate to a more mature science. Even in the early stages,
+however, the generalizations explaining a continuing pattern can function
+as general laws in a deductive argument. In addition, the patterned
+behavior can be written as a tendency statement and then operate in
+an inductive explanation.30
+A learning model can explain why event/interaction patterns repeat.
+In behavioral psychology, an individual's patterns result from prior
+socialization. Kenneth Langton states that, " . . . the continuity of many
+29 Abraham Kaplan, Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco 1964), 332.
+30 Carl G. Hempel, "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation," in H. Feigl
+and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis
+1962), 98-169.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 15
+patterns over time and place suggests that the individual has been modified
+in the course of his development in such a way so that he often
+exhibits persistent behavior apart from the momentary effect of his
+immediate environment. This behavior results from the socialization
+process: an individual's learning from others in his environment the
+social patterns and values of his culture."31 Hence, socialization models
+seem appropriate to explain why an event/interaction pattern will hold
+in the future. One can classify learning and game models as similar
+explanations of rational behavior. Simon asserts that, "Implicit in any
+theory of learning is a motivational assumption—i.e., that learning consists
+in the acquisition of a pattern of behavior appropriate to 'goal
+achievement,' . . . In parallel fashion, game theory . . . (is) concerned
+with discovering the course of action in a particular situation that will
+'optimize' the attainment of some objective or 'payoff'."32
+Since learning and game models both explain rational choice behavior,
+it may be possible to subsume event/interaction patterns under
+a more general model based on rationality.33 Thus, an event/interaction
+sequence only appears to be non-rational. It may not be the least theoretical
+of the interaction models discussed above. An event/interaction
+analyst, however, need not pay attention to the implicit assumptions
+concerning learning and/or rationality. For example, McClelland and
+his associates identified recurring patterns in the flows of events with
+little reference to assumptions about learning or rationality which
+might have explained such patterns.34 Given their purpose of forecasting
+from these patterns, it may be adequate just to know the existence
+of patterns rather than why the pattern existed.
+If one does not know why the pattern exists, he may have difficulty
+anticipating changes in patterns. Learning models may explain why
+international event patterns exist or change. In world politics, just as
+in behavioral psychology, one may need to know prior reinforcement
+and present behavior to forecast future behavior. Behavioral psychologists
+initiate their investigations and/or therapy by establishing prior reinforcement
+schedules. Thereafter, they monitor and reward present
+behavior in relation to the prior schedules. McClelland and his associ-
+31 Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York 1969), 3.
+32 Simon (fn. 5 ) , 274.
+33 Learning models, unlike game theory, use a more bounded concept of rationality.
+Goals may not be ranked, and search for an alternative which satisfies a goal replaces
+choice of an optimal alternative.
+34 McClelland, in Singer (fn. 12); McClelland and Hoggard, in Rosenau (fn. 9),
+711-24.
+16 RAYMOND TANTER
+ates would be on more solid theoretical ground if they first attempted
+to discover the prior reinforcement schedules of nations and then discovered
+their performance records.35
+The present study attempts to infer prior reinforcement from present
+interaction patterns. For example, if WTO tends to respond to NATO
+in the most intense phase of the Berlin conflict, this might reflect the
+experience of prior situations when WTO leaders were rewarded for
+responding to NATO actions during the intense phases of prior conflicts.
+Indeed, an assumption in this regard is that alliance leaders are
+more likely to recall learned behavior from the most intense phase of
+a prior conflict than from less intense phases. Moreover, as conflictive
+intensity increases, the greater may be the perception of interdependence
+among the actors. Oran Young, furthermore, suggests that actual
+interdependence increases during the most intense phase of conflict because
+each actor is able to exercise less and less control over the interaction.
+As a result, each actor increasingly considers both the actual and
+potential actions of the other party.36
+Nazli Choucri and Robert North also stress the interdependence of
+interactions during periods of high conflict intensity. In their contribution
+to this volume, Choucri and North discuss three models of international
+conflict behavior that deal with national expansion, competition,
+and crisis. The national expansion model assumes that a nation
+generates its own dynamic of conflict behavior irrespective of its rivals.
+The competitive model assumes that a nation's level of conflict may be
+a consequence of the difference in power capability between itself and
+its nearest rival. The crisis model assumes that a nation's involvement
+in conflict is a response to the behavior of the opponent. The crisis
+model anticipates reaction processes, as does the Richardson model. In
+arguing for a mixed model, Choucri and North assert that the earlier
+stages of a conflict are dominated by dynamics internal to the nation,
+as explained by the national expansion model. During later stages,
+processes of competition become more evident than the internal self-
+35 Acknowledgments to Judith Tanter for assistance with the behavioral modification
+analogy. Subsequently, McClelland and his associates have begun to use learning models
+in their World Event/Interaction Survey. Thanks to Gary Hoggard and John Sigler
+for bringing these learning models to the author's attention. See McClelland's "Verbal
+and Physical Conflict in the Contemporary International System," Mimeo, August 1970,
+especially 4-8.
+36 Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises
+(Princeton 1968), 19, 28; Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge,
+Mass, i960), 15-16. Note also that evidence suggests that perceptions become more
+important the more intense the conflictive interactions. See Ole Holsti and others,
+"Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Singer (fn. 12), 123-58.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 17
+generating forces. Even later come the interdependent interactions
+characteristic of crises. Some of their most important discoveries are
+the "breakpoints," where external dynamics begin to dominate internal
+dynamics as determinants of conflictive interactions.
+Following Choucri and North, the present study hypothesizes that
+internal attributes are more important in pre- and post-crisis phases.37
+The present study divides the Berlin conflict into three phases (precrisis,
+crisis, and post-crisis) in order to consider whether interdependent
+behavior between WTO and NATO increases during the crisis
+phase in contrast to other phases. During the crisis phase, an event/
+interaction model should explain alliance behavior more adequately
+than an organizational processes model. In short, limited rational actors
+learn patterns of interdependence from prior conflicts. They generalize
+these patterns and, particularly at the most intense phase of an
+ongoing conflict, tend to repeat the learned behavior.
+AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES MODEL
+Recall Charles McClelland's description of the international system.
+He ignores the internal attributes of the actors and stresses prior interactions
+as an explanation for current behavior. Graham Allison's foreign
+policy approach, on the other hand, ignores prior interaction and emphasizes
+standard operating procedures and the search behavior of complex
+organizations within each actor.38 An event/interaction model can
+employ the concept of learning to explain recurrent patterns between
+actors; the organizational processes model can use learning to explain
+organizational routines and search processes within actors.
+One important set of organizational routines are standard operating
+procedures (SOP's). The existence of standard operating procedures
+implies that the actor is adaptively rational. Although the actors are
+business firms, Richard Cyert and James March suggest that standard
+operating procedures are the result of a long run adaptive process
+through which a business firm learns.39 Standard operating procedures
+are internal characteristics of the actor. If the actor has a need to behave
+adaptively in the changing environment of a conflict, however, he has
+37 T h e temporal domain of the present study differs from the Choucri-North study.
+They base their study on observations covering the period 1870-1914, while the present
+study concerns the eight-month period immediately prior, during, and after the intense
+conflict over Berlin in 1961. While the important events in the Choucri-North study
+unfold over a period of years or even decades, the theoretically meaningful unit of time
+in the present study is a period of days.
+38 Allison (fn. 2), explicitly acknowledges other models of foreign policy decisionmaking,
+e.g., Allison's rational actor model explicitly includes interaction.
+39 Cyert and March (fn. 17), 101 and 113.
+18 RAYMOND TANTER
+to take into account the dynamic nature of that environment. Standard
+operating procedures are not tailored to specific environments. Rather,
+they are generalized routines which have been applied previously to
+similar problems.40
+When a conflict occurs, standard operating procedures may not be
+an adequate basis for decision-making. In routine situations, the explanation
+of the output of an actor may depend heavily on standard operating
+procedures. During a conflict, rational adaptation suggests that the
+actor search for more innovative solutions than those provided by
+standard operating procedures. As Julian Feldman and Herschel Kanter
+assert: "The major variable affecting the initiation of search is dissatisfaction—
+the organization will search for additional alternatives when
+the consequences of the present alternatives do not satisfy its goals."41
+The concept of search fits nicely with the idea of "satisficing"—an actor
+searches until he finds an alternative which is satisfactory.42
+During a conflict, the organizational standard operating procedures
+tend to give way to search processes which are more likely to respond
+particularly to the external environment. Even these search processes,
+however, occur primarily in the neighborhood of prior or existing alternatives
+because of the prominence of these options and the ease of
+calculating their consequences. In this respect, search simply builds
+incrementally on standard operating procedures relying on prior cases
+to provide alternatives that may satisfy organizational goals.
+Organizational processes models are to event/interaction models as
+decision-making models of the firm are to some economic explanations
+of firm behavior. That is, some economic explanations stress the environment
+external to the firm as the basis of rational choice. Regarding
+event/interaction models, the market-determined firm is equivalent to
+the international system-determined nation. The external environment
+in a market economy consists of all other competitive firms, e.g., all
+firms are striving to maximize net revenue, given certain prices and a
+technologically determined production function. Similarly, consider
+nations as firms, where nations seek to maximize their national interest.
+If the market determined each firm's behavior irrespective of internal
+organizational processes, domestic attributes would be irrelevant to an
+explanation of a nation's foreign policy decisions. Cyert and March provide
+an alternative to the market-based ideas just as Allison provides
+"Allison (fn. a ) , 85.
+41 Julian Feldman and Herschel Kanter, "Organizational Decision-Making," in
+James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago 1965), 662.
+42 Donald W. Taylor, "Decision-Making and Problem Solving," in March, ibid., 662.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 19
+an alternative to international system ideas. Cyert and March supplement
+market analysis with an explanation of the internal operation of
+the individual firm. Indeed, their analysis indicates that a firm's resource
+allocation decisions are very dependent upon prior patterns of
+allocation.43 In a related inquiry, Aaron Wildavsky finds that the most
+important determinant of the size and content of a given year's budget
+is the previous year's budget—a type of organizational incrementalism.44
+Organizational processes models are to event/interaction models as
+decision-making models of budgeting are to community power studies.
+For example, John P. Crecine's study of municipal budgeting employs
+a decision-making model that stresses organizational factors. His findings
+provide empirical support to the organizational processes model of
+Cyert and March. Crecine finds that the lack of adequate data on
+agency performance leaves the decisionmakers with little choice. They
+must use prior budgets as a reference for current budget decisions.
+Crecine also discusses external citizen demand in the budgeting process.
+This kind of external demand has a counterpart in the event/interaction
+model of the present inquiry. Crecine acknowledges that external citizen
+demand may determine the pattern of expenditure within certain
+accounts. But he finds that there is no direct connection between political
+pressure and departmental budget levels. Crecine does suggest,
+however, that external pressures may have a cumulative, long run effect
+on governmental problem-solving.45 In contrast, community power
+studies assume a process of mutual interaction comparable to the event/
+interaction model presented here. Community power studies do not
+allow for organizational explanations of the process by which local
+governments allocate values. The community power studies assume
+that a business dominated elite, or multiple elites specializing in particular
+issues, determine governmental resource allocation.46 In other
+words the elitist and pluralist community power models both assume
+that resource allocation in the polity is a consequence of external factors,
+an assumption comparable to the logic of the event/interaction model.47
+43 Cyert and March (fn. 17).
+44 Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston 1964), n ff.;
+also cf. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration
+Review, xxxvi (Spring 1959), 79-88; David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom,
+A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York 1963).
+45 John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of
+Municipal Budgeting (Chicago 1969), 219; "Defense Budgeting: Organizational
+Adaptation to External Constraints," RAND Corporation (March 1970).
+46 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel
+Hill 1953).
+4T Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New
+Haven 1961).
+20 RAYMOND TANTER
+There are several implications from organizational studies which are
+relevant to the present inquiry.48 One such inference is that rriost actions
+taken by alliances may consist of the repetition or continuance of what
+was done in the past. In the absence of some reason to change behavior,
+alliances may simply continue doing what they have been doing.49 An
+organizational processes model assumes that most present behavior is
+a result of prior behavior and organizational routines. Explanation of
+an action begins at the base line of prior behavior and routines, noting
+incremental deviations.50 The incremental deviations may result from
+the external environment. Thus, the organizational based studies also
+suggest a combined interaction/organization model.
+Recall the specific hypothesis emerging from a foreign policy decision-
+making approach: an alliance's behavior during a conflict results
+from its own pattern of actions. Given the discussion of conflict phases
+above, consider the following expansion and modification of this hypothesis:
+an alliance's behavior in pre- and post-crisis results from its
+intra-organizational standard operating procedures and search processes.
+Specifically, WTO should respond more to its own prior behavior
+than to NATO during the pre- and post-crisis phases of the Berlin
+conflict, and similarly for NATO. Finally, the interaction/organization
+model simply combines the event/interaction and organizational processes
+models.
+DESIGN AND ANALYSIS DECISIONS
+A fundamental assumption of the design is that indicators can tap
+unmeasured concepts. That is, the data are the intensities of conflictive
+interactions between the WTO and NATO alliances. No data are presented
+here on such theoretically interesting concepts as learning, rationality,
+standard operating procedures, or search processes. Nonetheless,
+the design assumes that event/interaction patterns can be used as
+indicators of these theoretically significant concepts.51
+If an alliance's current actions are a response more to its own prior
+behavior, the inference is that organizational processes are more important
+than interaction patterns. Conversely, if an alliance's current
+48 SOP's in bureaucracies imply long-term stability of behavior, while the present
+analysis treats continuity of action over periods of several days. Nonetheless, the organizational
+literature may provide useful analogies for the study of short-term conflict.
+49 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The Brookings
+Institute (March 1970).
+50Ibid.; Allison (fn. 2).
+51 Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "The Measurement Problem: A Gap between the Language
+of Theory and Research," in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. and Ann B. Blalock, eds., Methodology
+in Social Research (New York 1968), 5-27.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21
+actions are a response more to the other alliance's prior behavior, then
+the inference is that interaction patterns are more important than organizational
+processes. In both cases, measured indicators (actions) tap
+unmeasured concepts (e.g., event/interactions and organizational processes).
+By no stretch of the imagination, then, does this design test
+models or their implications. Rather, the design simply evaluates the
+models which seem to be implied by certain patterns in the data. This
+design is inductive in orientation, but it does more than search for regularities
+in the data. The study uses patterns as a point of departure for
+making inferences about models. In short, the design seeks to develop
+an interface between strategies that stress logical closure via tight models
+and those which search for empirical regularities.52
+Specifically, the design allows for the evaluation of the following
+hypotheses:
+1. Prior WTO connective action intensities determine current
+WTO action intensities.53
+2. Prior NATO conflictive action intensities determine current
+NATO action intensities.
+3. Prior WTO conflictive action intensities determine current
+NATO action intensities.
+4. Prior NATO conflictive action intensities determine current
+WTO action intensities.
+5. Prior WTO and NATO conflictive action intensities determine
+current WTO action intensities.
+6. Prior WTO and NATO conflictive action intensities determine
+current NATO action intensities.
+The first four hypotheses correspond to the paths in Figure 1. Hypotheses
+five and six combine paths one and four as well as paths two
+and three respectively. Paths one and two are called vertical paths
+while three and four are the diagonal paths in this study. If the diagonals
+are greater than the verticals, this might indicate that an event/
+interaction model is more valid than an organizational processes model.
+If the verticals are greater than the diagonals, this might indicate that
+an organizational processes model is more valid than an event/interaction
+model. If both the diagonals and verticals are equally strong, this
+might indicate that the interaction/organization model is the valid one
+relative to its components. If neither the diagonals nor the verticals are
+52 See the article by Oran R. Young in this volume regarding strategies that stress
+logical closure and those that emphasize the search for empirical regularities.
+53 The term action intensity includes both word and deed intensities.
+22 RAYMOND TANTER
+strong, this might indicate one or two things: ( i ) the models specified
+here are invalid; (2) a significant amount of measurement error is
+present in the data.
+NATO
+(2)
+FIGURE 1
+Prior Action Intensity
+(3)
+NATO
+WTO
+(4)
+Current Action Intensity
+(1)
+WTO
+With the six hypotheses diagrammed in Figure 1, the author hopes
+to account for the systematic variance in the study. Other variance may
+be due to error or is systematic variance which is extraneous here. The
+design, therefore, seeks to minimize error variance and rule out extraneous
+variance, e.g., rival hypotheses which might explain the dependent
+variables. One plausible rival hypothesis, for example, is that
+the actions of the Chinese People's Republic might determine the interactions
+between WTO and NATO. There is some evidence of a close
+connection between the long term connective actions of the C.P.R.,
+U.S.S.R., and the U.S.54 An assumption of this study, however, is that
+the relationship between the WTO and NATO countries in a given conflict
+is not a result of their respective interactions with China.
+A further design decision concerns the measurement of conflict intensity
+and the identification of the distinct phases of the Berlin conflict.
+Walter Corson made available his conflict intensity scale and coded
+data from the Berlin conflict of 1961.55 Corson divides the Berlin con-
+54 Walter H. Corson, "Conflict and Cooperation in East-West Relations: Measurement
+and Explanation," paper delivered at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political
+Science Association, Los Angeles, September, 1970. Also, see Allen S. Whiting,
+"United States-Chinese Political Relations," The University of Michigan, Mimeo,
+1970, 17.
+55 Corson constructed the scale in two phases. He administered questionnaires to 53
+citizens of 13 non-Western and Western countries. In the first phase, there were 54
+conflictive actions arranged in irregular order. With each action printed on a separate
+card, respondents arranged the actions in rank-order of increasing intensity. The responses
+from these questionnaires constituted information to compute a mean rankorder
+for each action, resulting in a 54-item rank-order conflict intensity scale. In the
+second phase, respondents had 14 conflictive actions selected from the original group
+of 54; these actions covered the full range of intensity. They were printed on separate
+cards and presented to respondents in irregular order. Respondents assigned a number
+to each action proportional to its intensity as they perceived it. Using the responses
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 23
+flict into five phases on the basis of changes in the types and intensities
+of both conflictive and cooperative behavior. Corson's second criterion
+for disaggregating the total interaction process is. events which act as
+obvious thresholds.
+The present study draws partially on Corson's criteria to specify the
+phases of the Berlin Conflict. In contrast to the Corson analysis, the
+present study excludes cooperative interaction patterns.58 Instead, total
+conflictive intensity scores are used for NATO and WTO by day from
+i May 1961 to 31 December 1961.
+The data show that conflictive intensity remains low until 25 July
+when President Kennedy announced major U.S. military preparations.
+Conflictive intensity peaked for WTO on 13 August when the East
+Germans sealed the border, and for NATO on 17 August when France
+and Britain strengthened their armed forces and NATO demanded an
+end to the travel ban. The last high conflict peak occurred on 17 September
+when the U.S.S.R. protested West German air intrusion over
+Berlin. Beginning with the meetings between Soviet Premier Khrushchev
+and Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak on 18 September over the
+German treaty, events of moderate cooperative intensity occur with relative
+frequency. The time from 25 July to 17 September is thus delineated
+as the crisis phase for three reasons: (1) conflictive interaction
+is more intense during this 56 day period than during any other; (2)
+although this phase has several clear peaks, the intensity remained
+high for several days; and (3) the crisis phase begins on 25 July with an
+event of high conflictive intensity and ends with an event on 17 September
+of high conflictive intensity. Figure 2 presents all three phases
+of the 1961 Berlin conflict.57
+The design evaluates the three models of conflict (event/interaction,
+organizational processes, and a combination of both) and their corresponding
+hypotheses by regressing each alliance's current conflictive
+action intensity (dependent variable) on both its own prior conflictive
+from these questionnaires, the geometric mean for each event reflected its intensity
+across respondents. From these data, he developed a 14-item conflict intensity scale
+and assigned intensity values by interpolation to the remaining 40 conflictive actions.
+Details of the scaling project are given in Walter H. Corson, "Conflict and Cooperation
+in East-West Crises: Dynamics of Crisis Interaction," unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
+Harvard University, December, 1970.
+56 T h e conflict phases outlined in this paper are based on empirical data from a
+specific conflict and describe only that conflict. Work is under way by the author and
+his colleagues on the development of a process model of conflict which will draw on
+this analysis but not be limited to it.
+57 Corson originally identified five conflict phases: pre-crisis, intensification, peak,
+reduction, and post-crisis. For the present analysis, crisis includes intensification, peak,
+and reduction. Corson (fn. 55).
+24 RAYMOND TANTER
+FIGURE 2
+PHASES OF THE 1961 BERLIN CONFLICT
+Phase Period No. of Days
+All Phases 1 May 1961 - 31 December 1961 245
+Pre-crisis 1 May - 24 July 84
+Crisis 25 July -17 September 56
+Post-crisis 18 September - 31 December 105
+action intensity and the other alliance's prior action intensity for each
+phase of the Berlin conflict. These operations yielded the path coefficients
+reported in this analysis.
+A crucial substantive and design problem confronted in this paper
+is the meaning of time. As a variable and unit of analysis, time is usually
+measured in terms of increments of solar time—minutes, hours,
+days, weeks, months, years, and so on. Yet it is very likely that time
+holds a different meaning for decisionmakers caught up in a crisis.
+Time, thus, could be thought of as "diplomatic time" and measured in
+a variety of ways including aggregating solar time to periods of specific
+duration on the basis of explicit theoretical criteria, or abandoning solar
+time units altogether. A variety of studies of crisis58 converge in their
+identification of two criteria integral to the nature of crises: (1) action
+intensity, and (2) elapsed time between actions.
+Corson finds that the elapsed time between actions varies inversely
+with total conflictive intensity in his study of the 1961 Berlin conflict.59
+This implies that as events increase in conflictive intensity, they also
+become more frequent. However, a day is the unit of time in this study
+for three reasons: (1) the author knows of no theory relating the frequency
+of events with the intensity of conflict in a continuous fashion;
+58 Holsti and others, in Singer (fn. 12); Hermann (fn. 15); Corson (fn. 55). Thanks
+to Paul Smoker for his thoughts on the study of time.
+59 Corson (fn. 55), 186. Corson speculated that time period should be an aggregation
+of days rather than a single day. T h e criteria he employed are three: (1) if total conflictive
+intensity for N A T O and W T O on a given day was less than 30 on the Corson
+scale, the intensity of conflictive actions on that day and the preceding six days predicted
+the intensity of conflictive actions for the next three days; (2) if total given
+intensity on a given day was between 30 and 150, action intensity on that day and the
+preceding four days predicted action intensity for the next three days; and (3) if total
+intensity on a given day was greater than 150, action intensity on that day and the
+preceding two days predicted deed intensity for the next two days. There are at least
+three difficulties with this method. First, it is difficult to implement this aggregation
+scheme without overlapping time periods. Second, the method is discontinuous when it
+should most properly be of the form
+t = all
+where / is the aggregation period, /, the conflictive intensity, and, a, the proportionality
+constant. As the intensity gets large the aggregation period gets small. Third,
+the method only represents more intuition than empirical finding.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 25
+(2) if time periods were aggregated, stronger relationships would be
+found according to the "ecological fallacy;" (3) the multi-lagged
+models tested did not contribute any additional information over and
+above the single-lagged models.00 Thus, the study predicts current action
+intensity by prior action intensity across each day of the conflict.
+A further decision was to aggregate data to the alliance level of analysis.
+61 An initial decision was to study only Soviet-American behavior in
+the Berlin conflict. It became apparent, however, that East and West
+Germany would have to be included. Then what does one do with
+relevant actions by other countries during the conflict? These actions
+should also be taken into account. Hence, the alliance became the unit
+of aggregation. The alliance unit of aggregation may be more valid
+for a case such as Berlin than for a case such as the Cuban Missile Crisis
+of 1962. There, alliance participation was secondary to the Soviet-American
+confrontation.02
+Regarding the data, there are 337 events for the Berlin conflict from 1
+May 1961 through 31 December 1961—245 days. Primary data sources
+included the New Yor\ Times front page, Deadline Data on World Affairs,
+as well as The World Almanac and Boo\ of Facts, 1961, 1962. The
+present study does not use events per se in analysis. Rather, the daily
+intensities aggregated across events for each alliance comprise the data
+for analysis. The coding and aggregation design decisions prepared the
+data for analysis. The method used is path analysis, which consists of regression
+analyses of theoretically specified relationships using standardized
+data.03 Path analysis is appropriate for determining the relative
+contribution of competing paths in explaining a dependent variable.
+The assumptions of the method compare nicely with the measurement
+60 Multi-lagged models were run under two hypotheses: (1) the connective intensity
+on any given day would be some linear combination of the conflictive intensities of
+the previous six days; (2) conflictive intensity would have a decreasing effect as time
+from the present increased. Neither of these two hypotheses were supported by the
+models or the data. The only different model which arose out of this analysis is found
+in footnote 73.
+61 Aggregating to the alliance level as in the present study may result in a lack of fit
+between an organizational model and the alliance. The study assumes, however, that
+organizational models are equally valid irrespective of the level of analysis.
+62 In the Berlin conflict of 1961, 2 8% of W T O actions recorded involved other W T O
+members acting with or without the U.S.S.R.; 48% of all N A T O actions recorded
+involved other NATO members acting with or without the United States. See ibid.
+63 Here is a summary of the methodology: The independent variables are prior
+WTO and/or prior NATO action intensities. Both word and deed intensity comprise
+the action category. The author standardized action intensity within the three conflict
+phases for each alliance, e.g., action intensity had a mean of zero and a standard deviation
+of unity, pre-conditions for path analysis. Standardized NATO and WTO action
+intensities were each regressed on standardized prior NATO and WTO action intensities,
+resulting in the path coefficients.
+26 RAYMOND TANTER
+system and theoretical specification of this study. For example, path
+analysis assumes interval scale data and specification of some of the
+paths. The Corson scale probably meets the interval level assumption,
+and the present study specifies most of the paths explicitly.
+ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
+Here is a very brief historical overview of key events in the Berlin
+conflict from i May 1961 through 31 December 1961, followed by the
+path analysis whose purpose is to evaluate the three proposed models.64
+During May of 1961 (pre-crisis) WTO countries began to intensify
+their demands that the West terminate its presence in Berlin. There
+was concern with the problem of the flow of refugees fleeing East Germany—
+almost 200,000 in i960. The refugee problem was a major
+motivating factor in precipitating the conflict. Recall the inference from
+the Choucri-North study that during the pre-crisis phase it is likely
+that the focus would be on internal attributes of the actor rather than
+on the opponent's actions. Intra-alliance factors such as the refugee
+problem and potential unrest in East Germany appear to be more important
+than NATO actions as determinants of WTO conflict intensification.
+There followed a slow but steady intensification of conflict
+which, although self-generated, was modified by Western actions occasionally.
+The WTO "ultimatum" of June, the threat to sign a separate
+peace treaty with East Germany and end the legal basis for the Western
+presence in Berlin, illustrates a key event in the intensification.
+In the crisis phase there seemed to be a greater amount of competitive
+action and reaction than in the pre-crisis phase. For example, the WTO
+actions of 13 August 1961 to erect the Wall may have resulted from
+WTO dissatisfaction with Western response to the demand for a separate
+peace treaty with East Germany. The Western response consisted
+partly of a reiteration of three essentials: (1) continued allied presence
+in Berlin; (2) unrestricted access routes to and from Berlin; and (3)
+64 For a historical overview of the Berlin crisis, see: George Bailey, "The Gentle
+Erosion of Berlin," The Reporter (April 26, 1962); Arnold L. Horelick and Myron
+Rush, "The Political Offensive Against Berlin," Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign
+Policy (Chicago 1965), chap. 10; John W. Keller, Germany, the Wall and Berlin:
+Internal Policies During an International Crisis (New York 1964); Jean Edward Smith,
+"Berlin: The Erosion of a Principle," The Reporter (November 21, 1963); Jean Edward
+Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore 1963); Hans Speier, Divided Berlin (New
+York 1961); Jack M. Schick, "The Berlin Crisis of 1961 and U.S. Military Strategy,"
+Orbis, vm (Winter 1965); Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton 1966);
+Charles McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-
+1963," in Singer (fn. 12), 159-86.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 27
+freedom for West Berliners to choose their own form of government.
+The Western response consisted of concrete acts which strengthened
+NATO military forces and reinforced NATO troops in Berlin. (One
+could select an event from the post-crisis phase to illustrate the deemphasis
+on interaction and the consequent reassertion of domestic
+factors, but it is not necessary to illustrate the point.) One problem with
+selecting historical incidents as illustrations is that it is generally easy
+to find an event which demonstrates the idea! Systematic comparative
+inquiry seeks to avoid such biased sampling "to prove" one's ideas. A
+comparison of action intensities across time, based on a universe of
+events, is more valid than the selective sampling of events in a verbal
+descriptive account, although both are necessary.
+Another way of analyzing the Berlin conflict is to look at the level
+of conflictive intensities over time. For example, from i May through
+24 July, total conflictive intensity was low for both alliances.65 Disaggregating
+conflictive action into its components for a moment, consider
+the period between 25 July through 12 August. WTO threats were
+much higher in intensity than WTO disapproval, demands, or deeds.
+In contrast, NATO conflictive deeds were much higher in intensity
+than its words: disapproval, demands, or threats.66
+From 13 August to 17 September, conflictive intensities were at their
+highest levels. Disaggregating the conflictive actions from 13 to 26 August
+shows that WTO conflictive actions were comprised of low demand,
+high threat, and low to moderately intense deeds. In contrast, NATO's
+conflictive actions in this period had moderately intense deeds (including
+troop movements), high demand, and low threat intensity (including
+frequent protests of the border closing but few threats of action
+which would counter the closing). Between 27 August and 17 September
+the nature of WTO and NATO conflictive intensity levels are similar:
+threats and deeds were relatively high, disapproval and demands
+were relatively low.07 In the post-crisis phase, 18 September through 31
+December, events of cooperative intensity were more frequent than
+those of conflictive intensity.68 In summary, total conflictive intensity for
+65 For the purposes of this study, 1 May 1961 is the beginning of the Berlin conflict.
+This establishes a base line period several weeks prior to the WTO ultimatum in early
+June.
+6 6Corson (fn. 55).
+67 Corson, ibid.
+68 T h e meetings between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Belgian Foreign Minister
+Spaak on 18-19 September mark the transition to the post-crisis phase. The analysis
+ends on 31 December 1961 because the frequency and intensity of actions began to
+approach the pre-crisis level of June.
+28 RAYMOND TANTER
+WTO and NATO averaged lowest in the pre-crisis phase (daily average
+= 14 points on the Corson scale), moderate in the post-crisis phase
+(29 points on the Corson scale), and highest in the crisis phase (96
+points on the Corson scale).
+Given this brief historical overview and the description of intensities
+of conflictive behavior, Figure 3 contains the results of the quantitative
+analysis. Recall the general proposition that the organizational processes
+model should explain alliance behavior in the pre- and post-crisis phases
+FIGURE 3
+RESULTS FOR THE 1961 BERLIN CONFLICT1'9
+(N = 245)
+Pre-Crisis NATO,.,
+.27
+NATO WTO.
+Conflict Days 1-84
+N =83
+Crisis NATO,
+.12
+NATO WTO,
+Conflict Days 85-140
+N =55
+Post-Crisis NATO
+.13
+NATO
+WTO
+7-1
+.14
+WTO,
+Conflict Days 141-245
+N=104
+69 Note that when variables are lagged, you lose one degree of freedom. Thus, N is
+always smaller than the number of conflict days in each phase.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 29
+while the event/interaction model should explain such behavior during
+the crisis phase.'0
+The values in Figure 3 are path coefficients, which generally range
+from —1.0 to -f-i-o- They indicate the relative magnitude of each path
+in determining current alliance action intensity. High vertical path
+coefficients relative to the diagonals are consistent with an organizational
+processes model. Large diagonal coefficients relative to the verticals
+are compatible with an event/interaction model.71
+How are the numbers to be interpreted in light of the hypotheses of
+the study? Paths may be thought of as flows of influence between variables,
+indicating both the direction of the "flow" and the strength of
+the dependence of one variable on another. Donald Stokes likens paths
+to a system of interlocking waterways with the flow of water through
+the paths directed by gates and the amount of water flowing through
+each gate determined by the magnitudes of the path coefficients.72
+According to the organizational processes model for the pre-crisis
+phase, the vertical paths for both WTO and NATO should be
+stronger than the diagonals, and, indeed, this is generally the case. However,
+for WTO, the vertical path coefficient is only .06 while the diagonal
+is just •—-.ii. These results suggest that the model is inadequate
+and/or there is large measurement error in the data. On the other
+hand, the vertical path coefficient for NATO is .27 while the diagonal
+is .21. Given the small difference between these two values, it would
+seem that both the organizational process model and the event/interaction
+model apply to NATO activity in this period, but one should not
+draw strong inferences because of the small magnitude of the coefficients.
+The fit does not improve for the crisis phase, although, as one would
+expect, the event/interaction model has a slight edge in predictive
+power. For NATO, the diagonal path coefficient, .23, is twice as large
+as the vertical, .12, but given the small sample size the difference would
+70 Besides the organizational processes model, there are several other foreign policy
+type models that might explain incremental outputs during the pre- and post-crisis
+phases (cf. Allison and Halperin in this volume).
+71 The path coefficients for the entire period can be seen in the following diagram:
+22 ^~~^~^^^ 14 Entire P«riod
+* ^ ^ " ^ - ^ * N = 244
+NATO,
+72 See Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths in Political Analysis," The University of
+Michigan, Mimeo, n.d.
+30 RAYMOND TANTER
+not be statistically significant.73 The fit is even worse for WTO; the
+diagonal path coefficient, .11, is about the same as the vertical path coefficient,
+.08. Thus, one should be cautious in drawing any inferences.
+In the post-crisis phase, the vertical coefficients are larger than the
+diagonals, but not of sufficient magnitude to suggest a reversion to
+standard operating procedures and the organizational processes model.
+For NATO the vertical coefficient is .13 while the diagonal coefficient
+is .01. For WTO the vertical coefficient is .14 while the diagonal coefficient
+is —x>8.74
+Given the inconclusive results of the data analysis, the author cannot
+select between the models. The organizational processes model may or
+may not be adequate for the pre-crisis and post-crisis phases; the organizational
+processes model might be as relevant or irrelevant to the crisis
+phase as the event/interaction model.75
+There are at least three possible explanations for the inconclusive
+results. First, the models may be mis-specified; that is, not all of the
+predictive variables were included in the analysis. Recall that the refugee
+problem was a major motivating factor in precipitating the conflict.
+Thus, at least one major causal variable was left out of the model. Indeed,
+internal conflictive behavior was left out of the model. There is
+justification for expecting little relationship between domestic and
+foreign conflictive behavior, but now may be the time to re-examine the
+73 This study does not use statistical inference procedures in evaluating the models.
+Here is an alternate model for NATO in the crisis phase, the only instance where the
+author felt the multiple lags contributed new information:
+= 55
+Here is an indication of the strength of the interaction relationships. NATO reacts
+strongest to WTO actions lagged by four days.,
+74 Results of an earlier analysis using the aggregation periods defined in footnote 59
+supported the hypotheses that organizational processes were more important in the preand
+post-crisis phases, and that organizational processes may have been important in
+the crisis phase as well. Because of the reasons stated in the text, most especially because
+of the ecological fallacy, these results are not presented here. Although the ecological
+fallacy demonstrates little effect on the functional relationship between variables,
+the regression coefficient, it has profound effects on the strength of that association,
+the beta weight. In path analysis only the beta weight is presented, which would be
+inflated because of the aggregation of days. Thus, it may be misleading to draw inferences,
+based as they might be on an artifact of aggregation. For a reference, see
+Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill
+1964), 97-114.
+73 Given the alternative model in footnote 73, it appears that the event/interaction
+model has more explanatory power for NATO during the crisis phase.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 31
+internal-external relationship, given the nature of the Berlin conflict.76
+Second, the Corson scale as used here may be inappropriate. Summing
+conflictive intensities about interactions may not be sufficient
+to tap such theoretically interesting concepts as standard operating procedures.
+The Corson scale should be re-examined for its assumptions
+and its applicability to models of relevance to the current study.
+Third, there is some question as to whether action intensity, which is
+the aggregate of both words and deeds, should be used as the indicator
+in the models. Action intensity was used initially as a means of tapping
+the total behavior of the actors, but this may be unsatisfactory for three
+reasons: (i) deeds have a longer preparation time than words; (2)
+international politics words can be disregarded with greater frequency
+than deeds—it is very difficult to ignore the Berlin Wall; (3) words are
+subject to greater misinterpretation than deeds. The author is at present
+addressing himself to the above problems in his forthcoming book on
+the 1948-49 and 1961 Berlin conflicts."
+IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MODELLING AND MANAGEMENT
+The twin goals of this paper are to make a tentative evaluation of
+models based on an international system approach, a foreign policy
+approach, and a combination of these two approaches; and to infer
+from the evaluation of these models some implications for conflict
+modelling and management. The inconclusive nature of the above
+analysis only points up the problems facing the conflict manager, and
+in this section the author attempts to address the implications of the
+study of the Berlin conflict of 1961 for the more general problem of conflict
+management.
+If one is to generalize about conflicts, it would make sense to have
+information on as many cases as possible. An analyst hopes to draw
+inferences from a limited number of cases which are representative of
+the larger universe of all conflicts. The Berlin conflict of 1961 may not
+be at all representative. As McClelland indicates, the Berlin conflicts of
+1948, 1958, and 1961 may have been increasingly routinized as a consequence
+of a bureaucratic processing that became almost self-generating.
+That is, conflict over Berlin occurred so frequently that organizational
+processes assumed greater importance over time. Quite possibly, standard
+operating procedures grew up around the conflicts as a result of this
+76 Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,
+1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolution, x (March 1966), 41-64.
+77 Raymond Tanter, The Berlin Crises: Modelling and Managing International Conflicts
+(forthcoming, 1972).
+32 RAYMOND TANTER
+repetitive pattern.78 Yet, in a case such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of
+1962, the event/interaction model might be more valid within the
+crisis phase. Thus, it is important to create a universe of cases for the
+comparative inquiry of conflicts before drawing firm inferences from
+any one case. (The new conflict data should include information on the
+interactions and on organizational processes if possible.)
+In addition to obtaining data on more cases, it is necessary to explicate
+further the present models and to develop additional models to explain
+conflictive interactions. The present models allow one to make little
+sense of patterns in the data. Certainly, this result of the data analysis
+indicates a need to develop further process models that would describe
+and explain the evolution of conflict situations.'0 In the interest of preventing
+the explosion of conflicts into crisis, it is extremely important to
+discern the connection, if any, between apparently dissimilar conflicts.
+This might be accomplished through the development of models and
+through the long and tedious process of making, rejecting, and accepting
+hypotheses based on these models.
+The results of this study have other tentative implications for an effort
+at model-building. For instance, the evidence does not indicate that
+the author should ally himself with "disillusioned interaction analysts"
+and join the growing number of organizational analysts. Such a decision
+would be premature, especially since the times call for a synthesis
+of the two approaches. Perhaps the Thomas Schellings and Charles
+McClellands overemphasize the role of interaction processes; perhaps
+Graham Allison and Morton Halperin overemphasize organizational
+processes in relation to interaction notions. It is not for the author to
+say at this time; the jury is still out.
+How would the organizational theorists view the Berlin conflict?
+Halperin, for example, might claim that "In periods viewed by senior
+players as crises . . . , organizations will calculate how alternative policies
+and patterns of action will affect future definitions of roles and
+missions. . . . [Organizations] will press for policies which they believe
+78 This study, however, does not compare intensities for the three Berlin conflicts;
+rather, it only has data on the Berlin conflict of 1961. Thus, there are no hard data
+presented here on the routinization of conflict decision-making.
+79 Process modelling is a research strategy designed to disaggregate a complex set
+of interrelated events and behaviors into stages representing discrete actions or distinct
+choice points. Process models serve several useful purposes. First, they direct our attention
+to processes such as learning, forgetting, or precedent search which underlie
+highly complex patterns of behavior. Thus, process models reduce complex situations
+to their basic elements, permitting an economy of description and explanation. Finally,
+process modelling could explain the breakpoints in a conflict—those points where the
+internal dynamics give way to external factors.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 33
+will maintain or extend their roles and missions, even if at some cost
+to the immediate objectives of the President. . . ."so Regarding the present
+study, Halperin's explanation suggests that alliances should respond
+more to intra-alliance than to inter-alliance considerations. Halperin's
+explanation also poses the question whether alliances are useful units
+of analysis to tap organizational processes. (See footnote 61.) If bureaucracies
+respond, as Halperin contends, to their roles as defined within a
+particular country, there is no reason to suppose that this response is
+consistent with other countries in the alliance. Indeed, one might suspect
+the contrary. The alliance problem may account for the relatively
+weak organizational process link found in the analysis of the Berlin
+conflict of 1961. To determine the effects of organizational processes, it
+might be better to examine individual countries and, especially, the
+various bureaucracies in those countries.
+One of the more interesting aspects of this study comes from the
+examination of the plots of conflictive intensity. For the pre-crisis and
+post-crisis phases, activity is relatively minor; many of the days register
+no activity at all. This might conform to Halperin's statement that,
+". . . most of the actions taken by bureaucrats . . . involve doing again
+or continuing to do what was done in the past. In the absence of some
+reason to change their behavior, organizations keep doing what they
+have been doing."81 This notion of "bureaucratic incrementalism," explaining
+the performance of foreign service personnel around the
+world, is certainly intuitively appealing. Evidence from the budgeting
+studies, moreover, suggests that municipal politicians may have something
+in common with their statesmen counterparts in the foreign
+service.
+There is a problem, however, with the incrementalist thesis. How
+can the incrementalist thesis account for an innovative sequence of interactions
+such as WTO's ultimatum to NATO, NATO's response increasing
+its conventional military capabilities, the Berlin Wall, and
+negotiations ? Although these events are measured, the present quantitative
+analysis fails to account for such innovative sequences. Similarly,
+the budgeting studies which stress quantitative budget totals may overlook
+the quality of the programs. Thus, quantitative analysis needs to
+be supplemented by a study of the qualitative aspects. The latter may be
+more apt to yield event/interaction sequences.82
+80 Halperin (fn. 49), 50.
+81 Ibid., 9.
+82 As stated previously, however, one must be careful to avoid selecting historical
+events in order "to prove" one's hypothesis. Thanks to Alexander George for the
+critique of the incrementalist thesis regarding the quality of programs.
+34 RAYMOND TANTER
+In summary, this study implies that in modelling conflict an analyst
+should: (i) specify a universe of cases for comparative inquiry across
+conflicts; (2) further explicate the event/interaction and organizational
+processes models, emphasizing their formal axioms and data requirements;
+(3) develop process models that describe and explain the evolution
+of conflict in general—emphasizing breakpoints where internal
+dynamics give way to external factors; and (4) integrate qualitative
+evaluation of events with quantitative analysis, to ensure that one takes
+into account the nature of events.
+A project underway by the author and his colleagues seeks to implement
+those modelling implications with the construction of a
+Computer-Aided Conflict Information System (CACIS). Coders are
+classifying major power conflicts since World War II in terms of environmental
+factors, policy options, national interests and involvement,
+goals, intentions, resources employed (military, economic diplomatic),
+and outcomes. CACIS will also include a capability for specifying event/
+interaction and organizational models, among others, within the general
+framework of a process model of conflict. An important aspect of
+the process model will be its formal status. Rather than using the relatively
+loose verbal models of the present study, CACIS will emphasize
+tight, deductively oriented formal models.
+One principal attribute of CACIS is that it is being built around four
+separate but interrelated modules:
+1. The memory module which stores information about prior
+conflicts.
+2. The experience module which stores evaluations of strategies
+used in prior conflicts, and the number of successes, failures, or
+indeterminate outcomes.
+3. The involvement module which estimates the type and magnitude
+of interests (or values) of conflict participants.
+4. The operational environment module which includes external
+events and domestic political factors. This module could serve
+as the basis for the evaluation of the relative potencies of internal
+processes vs. external events on the policy-making process,
+as well as provide parameters for an all-machine simulation
+of conflict decision-making.
+A second major characteristic of CACIS is its reliance on the process
+of precedent search.83 That is, a party to a conflict, in seeking a solution
+83Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Cheryl Christensen, "From Causal Modelling to Artificial
+Intelligence: The Evolution of a U.N. Peace-Making Simulation," Massachusetts
+Institute of Technology, Mimeo, n.d.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 35
+commensurate with its goals, will search for prior conflicts similar to
+the current conflict as policy guides. Precedent search behavior assumes
+the existence of rules or "precedent logics"84—i.e., criteria guiding precedent
+search—as well as the identification of dimensions of similarity
+and differences along which conflicts may be located.
+CACIS supplements the Computer-Aided System for Handling Information
+on Local Conflicts (CASCON), developed by Lincoln
+Bloomfield and Robert Beattie.85 CASCON focuses on local conflicts
+between small powers or between a small power and one major power,
+while CACIS will include mainly the CASCON cases and those conflicts
+involving more than one major power. Some overlap, however, is
+expected in the sample of cases selected. CACIS will offer more options
+to the analyst through the programming of multiple models rather than
+the single model of local conflict of Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss in
+CASCON.86 Finally, unlike CASCON, CACIS is expected to have a
+machine simulation capability enabling the user to look at "what might
+have been" by recalling prior relevant cases, applying alternative policy
+options, and examining the simulated outcomes in relation to a current
+conflict.
+Implications of the present study for conflict management are less
+certain. Glenn Paige faced a similar problem in deciding whether to
+draw implications for conflict management from a single case—Korea,
+1950. He wondered ". . . whether it is not premature and irresponsible
+for the student of decision-making analysis to venture suggestions of an
+applied nature on the basis of a single case. . . ." Paige concluded that
+international crises are such important phenomena that it is well worth
+the risk to venture suggestions.8' Following Paige's lead, the present
+study will also make inferences regarding conflict management, with
+similar caveats about over-generalizing.
+The idea of conflict management assumes that conflicts are similar
+enough to plan for in advance. Some national security policy planners
+argue that the element of surprise places great constraints upon planning.
+For example, G. A. Morgan asserts: "The number of theoretically
+possible crises in the years ahead is virtually infinite. Even to try to plan
+systematically for all that are moderately likely would be a questionable
+silbid., 21.
+85 Lincoln Bloomfield and Robert Beattie, "Computers and Policy-Making: The
+CASCON Experiment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, xi (March 1971); Robert Beattie,
+and Lincoln Bloomfield, CASCON: Computer-Aided System for Handling Information
+on Local Conflicts (Cambridge, Mass. 1969); also cf. Fisher Howe, The Computer and
+Foreign Affairs (Washington 1967).
+86 Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for
+the igjo's (New York 1969).
+"Paige (fn. 15).
+36 RAYMOND TANTER
+expenditure of resources."88 Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern agree
+with this, concluding that planning is difficult because intense conflicts
+are " . . . essentially unpredictable.. . ."80
+The notion that conflict planning is virtually impossible because of
+unpredictability overlooks the fact that contingency planning takes
+place in several areas where phenomena are not easily predicted. For
+example, earthquakes are rarely predictable in advance. Nonetheless,
+areas where they frequently occur have developed standard operating
+procedures for processing the injured, alleviating congestion, and communicating
+in the absence of normal channels. Similarly, in international
+security planning, conflict need not be fully predictable for management
+plans to be written and used as general guides.
+Social scientists should not feel uncomfortable at being unable to
+make point predictions of specific events. Physicists often do not forecast
+individual events, but they are able to explain and forecast processes
+and general classes of events. Social scientists also should seek to explain
+and forecast processes and classes of events. Process models are promising
+ways of developing explanatory and predictive theory both for
+processes and general event-classes. The development of conflict intensity
+scales is a way of constructing more general event-classes.90 Computer
+based models and the acquisition of comparable data on a series
+of historical cases promise to improve the generality of event concepts.
+The creation of computer based models such as CACIS should
+facilitate conflict management in several ways. For example, the results
+of the coming inquiry might serve as a basis for specifying models in
+CACIS. Suppose then, that these analyses found that an organizational
+processes model explained WTO and NATO alliance behavior better
+than an event/interaction model, especially in the pre- and post-crisis
+phases. In such a case, a foreign policy decision-making approach may
+yield more than an international system approach for the conflict. If a
+new Berlin conflict were to erupt, an analyst might expect the predominance
+of intra- as opposed to inter-alliance factors. CACIS would allow
+the analyst to compare recurring conflict over Berlin with what oc-
+88 G. A. Morgan, "Planning in Foreign Affairs: The State of the Art," Foreign
+Affairs, xxxix (January 1961), 278. T h e thrust of Morgan's argument is for selective
+planning. However, some authors advocate more planning—J. C. Ausland and J. F.
+Richardson, "Crisis Management: Berlin, Cyprus, Laos," Foreign Affairs, XLIV (January
+1966), 291-303.
+89 Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning,
+Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 35
+(1968), 10-15.
+90 A conflict intensity scale produces more general classes than raw event data. That
+is, the scales allow an analyst to aggregate across a variety of events to calculate a
+general intensity score for the actor.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 37
+curred in 1948, 1958, and 1961, especially regarding the organizational
+processes of the actors. If such a comparison proved useful, the analyst
+might expect the bureaucratic patterns of the past to repeat themselves.
+As a result, the analyst can develop his plans anticipating standard
+operating procedures and search processes.
+Another way that CACIS might facilitate conflict management is
+as an aid to memory in the form of an information retrieval system.
+The information would describe prior conflicts, the policy measures
+used, and their consequences. The institutionalization of prior crisis
+patterns, and the policy measures employed, is important for several
+reasons. First, the memory of complex organizations too often resides
+in now departed personnel who were instrumental in prior conflict
+problem-solving. CACIS would thus be an aid to memory in immediately
+accessible form. As an aid to memory, CACIS would facilitate the
+search for alternative options. Recall the search style of limited rational
+actors—they learn to search for alternatives until they find the one that
+satisfies goal achievement.91
+It is also very important to institutionalize alternatives. During a conflict
+there is a higher probability that stress may cause the replacement
+of complex problem solving habits by more basic forms. That is, if
+stress is intense and persistent, there is a tendency for more recent and
+usually more complex behavior to disappear and for simpler and more
+basic forms of behavior to reappear.92 Thus, there might be a tendency
+to revert to the standard operating procedures and other familiar organizational
+routines during periods of highest conflictive intensity.
+Rather than bringing about a greater sensitivity to the external environment,
+crisis induced stress may result in increased reliance upon standard
+operating procedures in the intense crisis phase.
+Finally, institutionalization of alternatives would permit the examination
+of the consequences of conflict management attempts in prior
+cases. For example, Alexander George specifies seven principles of crisis
+management, some of which relate nicely to the present inquiry. He
+asserts that there should be: (1) high level political control of military
+options; (2) pauses in military operations; (3) clear and appropriate
+demonstrations to show resolution; (4) military action coordinated
+with political-diplomatic action; (5) confidence in the effectiveness and
+discriminating character of military options; (6) military options that
+91 James G. March, "Some Recent Substantive and Methodological Developments in
+the Theory of Organizational Decision-Making," in Austin Ranney, ed., Essays on the
+Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana 1962), 191-208.
+92 Thomas W. Milburn, "The Management of Crisis," Mimeo, 1970.
+38 RAYMOND TANTER
+avoid motivating the opponent to escalate; and (7) avoidance of the
+impression of a resort to large scale warfare.93 CACIS may aid the control
+over military options by specifying alternatives (emphasizing political
+ones?) and estimating consequences. CACIS could be used to
+evaluate the effects of timely pauses in military operations in a current
+conflict by suggesting what the implications were for such pauses in prior
+conflicts. CACIS may help develop clear and appropriate demonstrations
+of resolution, as well as help discriminate among options based
+upon such intensity scaling as developed by Corson. In addition, an improved
+Corson scale might allow for a more subtle selection of politicomilitary
+options and decrease the probability of escalation.
+SUMMARY
+The present study evaluates an international system and a foreign
+policy decision-making approach via their corresponding models:
+event/interaction, organizational processes, and interaction/organizational
+models. The design used actions between East and West in the
+Berlin conflict of 1961 to infer the unmeasured models. The Corson
+scale of conflict intensity provided a discriminator of politico-military
+options, even though there may be problems with the scale and the
+coding.94 The Berlin conflict of 1961 provided a laboratory for the exploration
+of the three models. The resulting path coefficients did not
+support the original hypotheses. The magnitude of the coefficients is so
+low that the results are inconclusive.
+The implications of this study for conflict modelling and management
+are tentative but potentially promising. Regarding modelling, the
+study concludes that analysts should: (1) specify a universe of cases for
+comparative inquiry across conflicts; (2) explicate the event/interaction
+and organizational processes models, emphasizing formal axioms and
+data requirements; (3) develop process models that describe and explain
+the evolution of conflict, emphasizing breakpoints where internal
+dynamics give way to external factors; and (4) integrate qualitative
+evaluation of events with their quantitative analysis to make sure that
+93 Alexander George and others, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston 1971),
+8-15.
+94 Cf. Edward Azar, "Analysis of International Events," Peace Research Reviews, iv
+(November 1970), 83. Azar asserts that, "We code events and measure their violence
+content with the 13 point interval scale. Although we realize that participants to a
+conflict situation do not use such an objective instrument, we maintain that they employ
+an implicit (or possibly explicit) scale which ranks signals by their violence
+content." Also see William A. Garrison and Andre Modigliani, Untangling the Cold
+War: A Strategy for Testing Rival Theories (Boston 1971), for an attempt to quantify
+and scale East-West interactions.
+INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 39
+the quality of the policies is taken into account. Regarding conflict management,
+the study concludes that: (i) the results of the present inquiry
+could help specify models for a Computer-Aided Conflict Information
+System, which could be used to compare a current conflict with prior
+relevant cases; and (2) CACIS might institutionalize prior alternatives
+and estimate their consequences in similar cases. Such institutionalization
+should expand the political options short of military force available
+to decision-makers. Finally, CACIS should not be used to freeze options
+on the basis of historical precedents. Rather, CACIS should provide
+a fresh set of alternatives for the adaptively rational actor.95
+95 Also, see Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in
+Models of the International System," in Knorr and Verba (fn. 3), 93-117. Acknowledgments
+to Dennis Doolin for calling attention to the danger of freezing options on
+the basis of historical precedents with a system such as CACIS. There is a great need
+for what Doolin calls ". . . creative politics—which is really the essence and true
+genius of politics—and there seems to be a danger in an approach that could view
+routinization as a rule of action." Letter from Dennis Doolin, 28 June 1971. CACIS
+attempts to address itself to Doolin's perceptive critique and to facilitate "creative
+politics."
\ No newline at end of file